Warrantless Searches Coming to S.C.: House Overrides Governor's Veto

I've opined before about the then-pending bill in the General Assembly which would give police virtually unfettered ability to search people who have been granted probation or parole.  With individual civil liberties in mind, Governor Sanford vetoed the bill when it landed on his desk.  But on Wednesday, April 28, the governor's veto was overridden by the General Assembly after 2 previous failed attempts.  The House voted 74-37, and the Senate voted 36-7, to force the bill into law, effective immediately.

The new law applies to conditionally released juveniles and youthful offenders, furloughed inmates, parolees, and people participating in community supervision programs.  It subjects them to search or seizure, without a search warrant, without cause, of their person, any vehicle they own or are driving, and any of their possessions.  Let that sink in.

Even though the law doesn't affect those who have been convicted of a Class C misdemeanor or unclassified misdemeanor carrying a possible sentence of 30 days or less prison time, it's still troubling.

House Speaker Bobby Harrell released a pandering and largely self-laudatory press release to announce the law's passage.  Speaker Harrell crowed, "These searches are completely warranted because convicted offenders are serving out their remaining sentences in the public in lieu of jail."  I'm sure the irony in calling these warrantless searches "warranted" isn't lost on the Speaker.  But to follow his logic, because the parolees are in public, they are not afforded the typical Fourth Amendment protections?  Further, in order to "reduce recidivism," we're going to go ahead and presume each and every parolee is going to break the law.  So why grant them parole in the first place?

So what does this mean for South Carolina criminal defense attorneys? [. . .]

Physical Observations Not Protected by "Probation Agent/Client Relationship"

We often hear about violations of attorney/client privilege, doctor/patient privilege, and priest/penitent privilege.  It's rare, then, that we see a court opinion centering on a statutory privilege between a probation agent and the criminal on probation.  In Hutto v. State, filed last Monday, the South Carolina Supreme Court considered just that.

In the process of burglarizing a 91-year-old woman's home and raping her, Hutto received several cuts on his arms and hands from broken glass.  A month later during a routine visit, Hutto's probation agent noticed the cuts.  The probation agent then relayed the information about the cuts to an investigator, which eventually resulted in Hutto being identified in a lineup.  At trial, the probation agent testified about the cuts on Hutto's arms and hands, and Hutto was convicted of burglary and criminal sexual conduct.

Hutto later applied for post-conviction relief, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective.  Hutto cited S.C. Code Section 24-21-290, which states: "All information and data obtained in the discharge of his official duty by a probation agent is privileged information, is not receivable as evidence in a court, and may not be disclosed directly or indirectly to anyone other than the judge or others entitled under this chapter to receive reports unless ordered by the court or the director."  Hutto's PCR argument was that, based on the statute, his trial attorney should have moved to suppress the agent's statement, as it was gained from privileged information disclosed by Hutto's probation agent.  The PCR application was denied, and Hutto appealed.  The Court of Appeals affirmed, and Hutto appealed to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court again affirmed the PCR court, holding that the probation agent's testimony should not have been suppressed, and thus there was no ineffective assistance of counsel.  Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Toal in a one-paragraph explanation reasoned that "the statute's purpose is to foster open lines of communication between the probation agent and client," and that the statute was not intended to encompass physical observations such as the probation agent noticing Hutto's cuts.  The Chief Justice continued that "anyone could have [noticed the cuts] when encountering [Hutto]."

To me, however, this fails to explain the Court's decision to avoid the plain, straightforward, and unambiguous language of the statute.  The statute bars the disclosure of "all information and data" unless it is specifically authorized or ordered otherwise.  The Court's reasoning is that interpreting the statute as literally written would prevent a probation agent from ever disclosing evidence of crimes.  The statute itself clearly rebuts this reasoning, since disclosure is allowed as long as it is ordered or authorized.  Certainly if there is clear evidence that a criminal on probation has committed another crime, the probation agent would petition a judge or court to allow disclosure of the fact.

 Justice Pleicones dissented, pointing out the plain language of the statute as well as the statute's inclusion of a procedure to disclose the information, which was not followed in Hutto's case.

The ruling may strike a blow to criminal defense attorneys in South Carolina who zealously represent their clients by challenging the procedures the State uses to introduce evidence against defendants at trial.  Police and prosecution agents should not be able to avoid statutory requirements when compliance will merely make things inconvenient for them.

Court of Appeals Clarifies Meaning of "Presenting" a Firearm

On April 5, the S.C. Court of Appeals released an opinion interpreting the meaning of "presenting" a firearm.  In In re Spencer R., the juvenile defendant was convicted of presenting a loaded assault rifle at a woman, the woman's daughter, and the daughter's friend -- a felony criminal offense carrying a maximum penalty of five years in prison.  The facts suggest that the defendant "stared down" the alleged victims while holding a loaded assault rifle in the 10 o'clock and 4 o'clock position (essentially, holding the gun at rest).  Although the defendant never actually pointed the weapon at any of the victims, the trial court found that the term "presenting" encompassed holding a firearm with the muzzle pointing up.

The Court of Appeals, however, disagreed with the trial court's definition.  In a per curiam opinion, the court adopted a definition of to present as "to offer to view in a threatening manner, or to show in a threatening manner."  Based on this new definition, the court still found there was sufficient evidence to convict the defendant of the presenting a firearm, based largely on circumstantial evidence.  Although the defendant was holding the assault rifle at ease, he "stared down" one of the victims as she passed by the defendant in a car.  Additionally, the defendant made statements earlier in the day about wanting to shoot and kill the victim.  The court's opinion clarifies a somewhat ambiguous statutory term, which may make it easier for criminal defense attorneys in South Carolina to better analyze pointing and presenting cases.